

Happiness Wrong Metric; Feedback on Syria; Invite Comment on Moral Wrestling

May 18, 2016



Zaatari refugee camp, Jordan

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Short Pieces

[Community and Economy](#)

Community and economy are two distinct realms of social life. In communities, we largely deal with one another as persons. We value people not only in their own right, but also as neighbors, friends, and those with whom we share a concern for the common good. In the economy, we largely deal with one another as buyers

and sellers, as consumers and marketers, and as management and labor. In this realm we often seek to maximize our self-interest.

Published in Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology (Blackwell Reference Online)

[The Court Should Curb Legalized Bribery](#)

On April 27, 2016 the Supreme Court began hearing the case brought against former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell for 11 counts of conspiracy to commit fraud. The case deserves much more attention than it has received so far, because it provides an opportunity for the Court to limit the harm it caused by Citizens United and previous cases by ruling that giving money to politicians amounts to free speech, and hence basically cannot be curbed. It could correct what amounts to legalized bribery by ruling that you may give all you wish — but not get any material benefits in return.

Published in the Huffington Post Blog

Longer Pieces

[Happiness is the Wrong Metric](#)

People are motivated not only by a quest for satisfaction but also by trying to live up to their sense of what is moral. This sense cannot be reduced to a form of satisfaction, among other reasons because it often engenders pain and sacrifice rather than pleasure. Analysis is enriched when we realize people are moral wrestlers who are pulled by both kinds of motivations. Such a recognition is also useful for public policy. The concept of well-being is a step forward but one must take into account that people can find meaning and purpose in bad behavior from gang-like activities to serving in ISIS.

This is the short version, as published in *Society*, followed by a symposium as seen below. An extended version is available [here](#).



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Calderwood Prize Essay in Public Writing: What's Missing
from the Current Smart Drugs Debate **Eloisa Cleveland**

De Vita Sua **Jan Vansina**

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Symposium: Understanding Happiness

Happiness is the Wrong Metric

AMITAI ETZIONI

Human Nature and Good Lives: Etzioni's Elisions

MIKE W. MARTIN

Motivationally Balancing Policy

GIL HERSCH

Moral Preferences

LISA BORTOLOTTI AND ANNELI JEFFERSON

Happiness is the Right Metric to Measure Good Societal Functioning

ROBERT A. CUMMINS

Adam Smith's Non-foundationalism

DANIEL B. KLEIN

Amitai Etzioni's Critique of Happiness

CAROL GRAHAM

Satisfiers Require Moral Constraints

STEVEN SURANOVIC

Meaning in Life as the Right Metric

THADDEUS METZ

Wrestlers and Jugglers: Etzioni on Happiness

CHRISTINE VITRANO

Surveillance and Surveys: The Soft Interview of the Future **Gary T. Marx**

Government and Philanthropy in Israel **Hillel Schmid and Hanna Shaul Bar Nissim**

Making Moral Judgments from a World-Historic Standpoint: The Case of Woodrow Wilson **Steve Fuller**

REVIEW ESSAY

The Multifaceted oeuvre of Raymond Aron **Daniel DiSalvo**

BOOK REVIEWS

Stephen Bates on Privacy in a Cyber Age: Policy and Practice · Robin Rogers on No Such Thing
As A Free Gift: The Gates Foundation and The Price of Philanthropy · Flagg Taylor on Lies, Passions
and Illusions · Gemma Mangione on Artifacts and Allegiances: How Museums Put the Nation and
the World on Display



By Fellow Communitarians

[The Ethics of Trump's Foreign Policy vs. Obama's Long Game by Nick Gvosdev](#)

Much of the reaction to Donald Trump's foreign policy speech on April 27 at an event hosted by the National Interest beyond the campaign-related questions of whether this address makes him look more presidential or electable, has focused on whether he offered coherent policy proposals. What I would like to do is briefly address the question of the ethics behind the foreign policy vision that was contained in those remarks (the prepared text, at least). Assuming that the speech accurately reflects his opinions and serves as the basis of his world view, we can draw some broad conclusions—and note the extent to which Trump is diverging from the “bipartisan consensus” that has generally characterized U.S. foreign policy approaches in the last several decades.

I Read

David Brooks continues to provide outstanding communitarian copy. The following two quotes, out of many that could be given, are straight communitarian text.

"All of these forces have liberated the individual, or at least well-educated individuals, but they have been bad for national cohesion and the social fabric. Income inequality challenges economic cohesion as the classes divide. Demographic diversity challenges cultural cohesion as different ethnic groups rub against one another. The emphasis on individual choice challenges community cohesion and settled social bonds."—"How Covenants Make Us," *The New York Times*, April 5, 2016

"I don't know what the new national story will be, but maybe it will be less individualistic and more redemptive. Maybe it will be a story about communities that heal those who suffer from addiction, broken homes, trauma, prison and loss, a story of those who triumph over the isolation, social instability and dislocation so common today."—"If Not Trump, What?," *The New York Times*, April 29, 2016

Brian Goedde praised President Obama for his focus on community colleges and the subsequent rise in school pride he has witnessed in community college students. He asks for Obama to do one more thing for community colleges: speak at one of their graduations.—"Talk to Us, Mr. President," *The New York Times*, May 13, 2016.

My Diary

In the March 7, 2016 issue of the newsletter, I suggested the following as a solution to the Apple v. FBI case:

Let us assume that Apple leaves the phones as they are—but develops a key to unlock them it keeps, protecting it by using Apple's high power encryption. Once a court orders that a given phone must be unlocked, the FBI will bring it to Apple, which will unlock it, and turn over to the FBI the found information — but not the key.

I also asked the following question:

Can a key kept by Apple under its high power encryption unlock selected phones without making other phones vulnerable?

Many expressed concerns with this idea. Examples are below.

Roger Bohn: "...Anything can be reverse engineered. Once Apple creates this tool, and the source code that goes with it, there are numerous ways that other players can end up getting their hands on the core ideas,

and implementing their own versions."

Phillip Schrod: "...the problem is not the technology, it is people getting careless about how they use the technology."

David Bantz: "NYC and [the] FBI have hundreds of phones they want to unlock. That would entail a process involving many people and loading the OS on many phones. That makes it possible maybe even likely that one of those people entrusted with that power is coerced or bribed or is clumsy enough to put it in the hands of criminals."

Steve Bellovin: "a key can be readily available or it can be secure, it can't be both."

On May 11, 2016, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. stated that until September 2014, the NYPD and DA regularly sent phones to Apple and they decrypted them. He implied that Apple stopped once it began to market its phones as the only mobile devices that cannot be decrypted.

Recent Tweets

US is picking a fight with China over some piles of rocks in South China Sea, meanwhile losing much of Arctic to Russia

LA wants streets to be places where communities interact, not just that cars pass by ow.ly/4nnL43

Almost half the world see themselves as 1st, global citizens and 2nd, citizens of their respective country <http://ow.ly/4nfQsr>

Re Trump foreign policy: What's wrong with a fortified military, used sparingly? Other nations pick up more of the tab?

Follow us on Twitter and join the conversation [@ICPS_GWU](https://twitter.com/ICPS_GWU)

Video

[The Five Minute Communitarian](#)



Your Responses Are Requested

What is the conception of human nature you hold scholars and policy makers should draw on: *Homo Economicus*, *Homo Sapiens*, the "Moral Wrestler," or others?

Homo Economicus collects information, processes it well, and draws logical conclusions, is rational. *Homo sapiens* processes information poorly, is not rational, and is influenced by passions.

"Moral Wrestler" views the person as being subject to an irreconcilable conflict between the quest for happiness (of one kind or another) and the quest to live up to their moral values. For more discussion, see [Happiness is the Wrong Metric](#).

Please send responses to icps@gwu.edu. Any responses received may be published in the next issue of the *Communitarian Observer*.

Feedback: Syria

Last month feedback was asked for on the following question:

If the U.S. and its allies intervene more forcefully and defeat the various terrorist groups in Syria—should they also insist on regime change? And should they stay after the armed conflict ends to help stabilize the government and help rebuild the country? Make it into a democracy?

Below are some of the responses:

Robert Ford, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute and former U.S. Ambassador to Syria

** with the passage of time, options still available to the USA and its allies for Syria are fewer and more difficult. Because of the presence of substantial Russian forces in Syria, there is no longer any option for military intervention to compel regime change. In any case, as we learned in Iraq, bringing about regime change in a place like Syria is not the final answer anyway, and the Americans most certainly cannot alone stand up functioning democracy in countries with histories like Iraq and Syria. In mid-2016 the Americans need to compel both the government and the more moderate rebels to negotiate some kind of ceasefire and there must be penalties on those who violate the ceasefire deal; that likely means there must be a neutral monitoring force on the ground, and the Americans will need to do heavy diplomatic lifting to help assemble one. Moreover, the Americans should work with Russia, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to bring the Syrian government and Syrian moderates (those accept there must be a political deal) to a negotiation to lay out at least an interim political agreement building off the ceasefire. That interim political deal that might involve localized security and control and governing autonomy if a new national government is too hard to agree upon. As the Syrian government so far has resisted any serious negotiation, and its violations of the cessation of hostilities deal of late February are particularly egregious, the Americans should be working with their allies now to give much greater help to Syrian moderates, armed and political, who accept that there must be a negotiation with eventual, serious mutual concessions. If the moderates refuse to negotiate, there is little the Americans can do, and given our tattered credibility our friends in the region will escalate with or without our involvement

John Esposito, Professor of Religion, International Affairs, and Islamic Studies, Georgetown University

A critical word here is "allies." If the US intervenes it should be not only with European allies but also, and most importantly, with regional (MENA) allies who should be major players financially and militarily. And

yes, some process for regime change would need to be agreed upon as well as a commitment to help stabilize and rebuild the country. It is not the role of outside powers to "make it [Syria] into a democracy" but to enable a process in which Syrians can determine the institutions for representative government. But this will be a very difficult process, given the fallout from the civil war in Syria.

Richard Betts, Director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University

If allied and American intervention were truly strong enough to defeat the "various terrorist groups in Syria" we could also defeat the Assad regime – and of course defeating it would be the requirement for regime change. But the cost of doing all this even in the best case would likely be astronomical, and ousting Assad in no way guarantees his replacement with a better regime.

The premise of the question is dubious. It is grossly overconfident to believe that an intervention of which we are practically capable would really defeat all the relevant contenders -- Islamic State, the Nusra Front, other radical Islamist opponents of Assad. It should be clear from experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan that radical opponents of western-sponsored regimes are resilient, tenacious, and too often more disciplined and militarily effective than the pro-western forces we support. Even full-scale occupation of Iraq did not defeat them completely, or even suppress them for long. More than a dozen years after invading we now see U.S. forces creeping back into combat there because of that failure. Military intervention in Syria would probably produce indecisive repression of terrorist-linked radical forces. Western military intervention is as likely to provoke, energize, and inflame terrorist activity as it is to defeat it. To contemplate another western attempt to defeat highly mobilized terrorist groups and their potential as well as actual recruits is naively reckless.

By all accounts the effective resistance to Assad comes not from any "moderate" opposition, but from the radicals of various stripes who overlap with the terrorist groups cited in the question. If those groups were really to be driven from the field Assad will be in a strong position, and replacing his regime would require another American war like the invasion of Iraq in 2003. On the other hand, if Assad is replaced *without* having first defeated all the radical Islamist opponents like Islamic State, who do we think will have replaced him? Regime change then is likely to mean not a liberal, pro-western, moderate regime, or even a conservative authoritarian one, but a regime of some collection of radicals, who will shove aside whatever pathetic moderates the West now supports.

Finally, there is no reason to believe that an occupation aiming to make Syria into a democracy will succeed any better than it has in Iraq or Afghanistan – depressing models for the interventionist enterprise. Just because replacing Assad's regime with a better one is necessary does not mean that it is possible.

Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

The United States and Syria

Whether the United States attempts to foster regime change and democracy in Syria depends, in the first instance, on whether America decides to intervene there militarily. The choice between going in and staying out is not a simple one; but in the end the United States is likely not to intervene, in no small part because the history of the last two decades has demonstrated that America cannot create democracy, or even stable governments, in other countries. On multiple occasions it has tried to do so and failed, which is the subject of my new book, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era*, which is published by Oxford University Press.

The United States does have major incentives to to defeat both ISIS and the regime of Bashar Assad, as well as Assad's principal ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Syria. The United States also has,

however, powerful motives to stay out of Syria, or at least to place strict limits on its involvement there, which is what the Obama administration has chosen to do. The next administration is likely to continue the current policy.

The poisonous, dangerous character of ISIS counts in favor of a more robust American effort to end its control of parts of Iraq and Syria, although American-led efforts to do this seem to be steadily reducing the territory it dominates. ISIS is a leading source of terrorism, and as long as its “state” exists it has the power to inspire Muslims the world over to commit terrorist acts such as the deadly attacks in Paris last November and Brussels in March.

Iran also poses a threat, specifically to the three major American interests in the Middle East: preventing a single power from dominating the region; preventing the spread of nuclear weapons there; and ensuring access to the region’s oil, on which the principal allies of the United States, the Europeans and the Japanese, heavily depend. Containing Iran is the single most important American strategic goal in the Middle East, and putting an end to Bashar Assad’s rule in Syria would help to accomplish it.

Finally, the ongoing war in Syria, especially the military tactics of the Assad government and its allies, has generated a wave of refugees that is pouring into Europe, creating a growing political crisis in a part of the world that remains extraordinarily important to the United States. Defeating Assad would ease, although not end, that crisis.

Yet along with these incentives for a full-scale intervention in Syria stand formidable obstacles to conducting operations that would be at once militarily effective and politically acceptable to the American public.

One such obstacle is what is called the “free rider” problem: allies who do not bear their fair share of the burden of a common task, in this case combating ISIS and the Assad coalition. Politics makes strange bedfellows, and in this case both President Obama and Donald Trump have complained about free riding by America’s allies, suggesting that it troubles the American public. Saudi Arabia, for example, vehemently opposes ISIS and, even more vehemently, Iran. The Saudis will not, however, make anything more than a token contribution of troops to fight them. Nor will Egypt, Jordan, or the much smaller Gulf Emirates. Unlike most of them, Turkey does have a serviceable army and the increasingly authoritarian Turkish government does generally oppose both ISIS and Iran. It is more strongly opposed, however, for a variety of reasons, to the Syrian Kurds, who have shown themselves to be a reasonably effective fighting force against ISIS. Turkey’s goals in Syria, that is, do not fully align with those of the United States.

Another obstacle to effective American intervention in Syria is Russia’s decision to become part of the Assad-Iran coalition. The Russian military presence would complicate any American military action. As during the Cold War, the United States would have to conduct such operations with two contradictory aims in mind: achieving its military objectives while at the same time avoiding a direct clash with a nuclear-armed adversary.

Finally, and most importantly, the disappearance of the Assad regime would create the need to put something in its place. To serve American interests, and to avoid grossly violating American values, a successor government would not necessarily have to be a full-fledged democracy, but it would have to be decent, stable, not hostile to the West, and at least minimally acceptable to the people it governed. In the Middle East, that is a tall order.

Moreover, in the wake of the Cold War the United States undertook missions of transformation around the world of the kind to which ousting the Assad regime would inevitably lead: in China, Russia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and in the wider Arab world – the subjects of the first five chapters of *Mission Failure*. All of them failed. The American government, that is, has demonstrated an inability to do what would have to be done in post-Assad Syria. Because of the recent and frequent experience of failure, the American public would not support such an effort. That is the principal reason that, despite the

compelling incentives to intervene, the United States will in all likelihood limit its engagement in Syria and not try to create a democracy there.

Michael Mandelbaum is the Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the author of *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford University Press).

Judith Yaphe, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs in the Institute for Middle East Studies, The George Washington University

Will Defeat of Terrorist Groups in Syria Bring Peace and Democracy? No.

The questions are: If the U.S. and its allies intervene more forcefully and defeat the various terrorist groups in Syria—should they also insist on regime change? And should they stay after the armed conflict ends to help stabilize the government and help rebuild the country? Make it into a democracy?

And the answers are? The answers to these questions are not clear, given the coalitions fighting the Syrian regime and supporting it, the fragmented nature of the Syrian opposition itself, and the role of regional actors in shaping Syrian end states. Traditionally, victors impose the conditions for the cease-fire, a peace agreement, and usually the successor government. The threat of regime change after a military defeat and of occupation until the country is stabilized and political and economic reconstruction has begun, however, will not guarantee regime change. Nor is acceptance of the victor's doctrines and values assured. No occupying power(s) can "make" Syria a democracy. History, however, provides some suggestions regarding what can happen when the more forceful and determined approach is tried and wins the battle.

What History Teaches

Two of the most recent and best documented examples of military intervention followed by a prolonged occupation are the defeat of Germany and Japan after World War II. The United States had 4 years to build its alliances, design a war plan for Europe and Asia, and create a new modern army, navy and air force to fight the second international war of the 20th century. It also had several years to plan for the day after, to learn from and train civilian and military experts about the societies confronting them, acquire specialists with language skills, and become familiar with their political cultures. These experts could help plan for the day after the cessation of hostilities, how the war could end and what kind of peace should be imposed.

In 1941, the United States lacked an intelligence community and a seasoned military. There were people with regional backgrounds and limited experience abroad in the private sector, including investment banks and universities, many of whom gravitated into government service when the war broke out.^[1] One of the questions for them was how to transition authoritarian societies unaccustomed to parliamentary, Western-style governance and insure that history would not repeat itself. It was agreed that vestiges of Nazi rule in Germany and Japanese authoritarian political traditions, including the god-like status of the Emperor, had to be ended and people made accountable for their actions before and during the war.

Similar questions would arise in the short period the Bush Administration prepared for the war for regime change in Iraq in 2003. In this example, Bush Administration officials were confident of their reasons for war and the sureness of their victory. What they did not anticipate was the impact of the war on a society that had survived thirty-five years of authoritarian rule under a ruthless dictator, 2 devastating wars, 13 years of sanctions, and the consequences of trying to reconstruct a society and a political culture with only their ideology as a guide. Nor did they pay attention to the preparatory work done by the State Department's *Future of Iraq* project, the *Day After* project by the Pentagon's think tank at the National Defense University, or the analysis of independent scholars and researchers on Iraq.

The staunchest advocates for regime change in Iraq, the so-called neoconservative elements of the George W. Bush administration, had urged regime change as policy for Iraq since the 1990s. Saddam Husayn, they

said, had flaunted all rules of international behavior by invading two of his neighbors; defied the UN by refusing to comply with Security Council resolutions, especially those requiring inspections for and destruction of weapons of mass destruction for destruction; provided safe haven, training, and support to international terrorists, including al-Qaida; and repressed Iraq's people with tactics of ethnic cleansing, pre-emptory arrests, torture, and execution of real and imagined opponents. The war, they argued, would be over quickly, Iraqis would welcome Americans as liberators, the military would defect en masse, and Iraqis who had experienced democracy while in exile would lead the country as it became an ally sharing our perceptions of risk while making peace with Israel. The new Iraq would be a source of emulation in the region, a model of democratic and economic liberalization and social change that would be the envy of its neighbors.

The military phase of the war was apparently conducted with some care and ended more quickly, with less damage to Iraq's special religious and historical sites and fewer civilian and U.S. military casualties than U.S. military pundits had predicted. Compared to 1991, the bombs were smarter and the strikes more focused. What did not happen is perhaps more interesting than what did occur. The war itself lasted little more than 3 weeks and Iraqi military resistance faded in many areas where attacks had been anticipated. No bridges and few oil wells were destroyed. No weapons of mass destruction with their long-range missile delivery systems rained havoc on Israel, Iraq's Gulf Arab neighbors, or U.S. and coalition armed forces. There was no Stalingrad-type battle for Baghdad, and no masses of refugees or internally displaced people on the move.

Yet, if most of the war-time focus was on carefully selected targets of high value to Saddam, his loyalists, and his Republican Guard and security services, much less care was paid to the dangerous period after Saddam's regime had collapsed and before a new administration was in place. The number of Iraqi civilians and military killed or injured in their homes, market places, or in battle is unknown. Despite the great care given to selected targeting during the war and to preserving the Oil Ministry after the war, martial law was not declared when looting began and little thought seems to have been given to protecting Iraq's hospitals and schools or its antiquities and treasures in museums and libraries. Iraqis who seemed to expect their lives to be transformed immediately were quick to criticize the Coalition and especially the Americans whom they assumed would fix everything.

Two problems appear to have impeded relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The first was the apparent disparity between military war plans and civilian reconstruction plans. Civilian administrators hoped to begin relief and reconstruction on a rolling basis, coming in behind the military once an area was secure. The military strategy, however, focused on reaching Baghdad to strike at the heart of Saddam's regime, a good strategy except that it meant bypassing many towns and cities in southern Iraq which contained strongholds of regime supporters, especially the dreaded Saddam Fedayeen, Ba'th Party enforcers, and some Republican Guard units. There was not enough time or military personnel to fight for Baghdad, secure towns, and insure the well-being of all Iraqis. Many Iraqis must have wondered, too, whether the U.S. military would once again leave them to their fate—as shields and targets of regime anger and revenge.

The second problem was more serious, if only because it is systemic. Squabbles between the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the Intelligence Community, which have been recounted in numerous press stories, impeded Administration efforts to plan for the post-Saddam period. Should the Pentagon be in charge of humanitarian aid, civil reconstruction and state-building, tasks not favored by military administrators? Who should be allowed to join the effort to rebuild Iraq? Is administrative experience and knowledge of Iraq and the region less important than political correctness? What are the risks and opportunities for American interests, and is there a danger these could conflict with Iraqi needs and interests? Who can we trust—should we rely only on Iraqis from the diaspora and how will we know who can be rehabilitated inside Iraq?

The time allowed for planning the day after in Iraq was brief. LTG (ret.) Jay Garner was named to head the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in December 2002. Two months and 2 interagency reviews later, he and his small team left for Iraq; they were kept waiting in Kuwait while the short war was

fought and won. Neither Garner, his successor Paul Bremer, who arrived in Baghdad in April to head the CPA, or their teams were familiar with Iraq's political history or culture and few had Arabic language capabilities. Nor did they anticipate the violence, poverty, and distrust which they were to confront. Government disappeared, looting was commonplace, and people retreated into tribal and territorial enclaves to seek protection.

Many but not all of the problems Iraq has confronted since 2003 began with the total collapse of governance and civil society, but the seeds for change and ethnic-sectarian-related violence were present in Iraq since the invention of the modern state in 1920 and are likely to persist after the Islamic caliphate is defeated. The rise of Islamic political movements began in the 1970s but Sunni extremism thrived with the occupation in the prisons run by the American military and among the disenfranchised Sunni Arabs who found themselves marginalized by Mr. Bremer's deBaathification and demilitarization laws. What was unique about the American intervention were the political and ideological dynamics driving policy at home and the failure to accept responsibility for the consequences.

If you replace Syria with Iraq in the above discussion, then you may see a hint of what could happen in Syria before and after the end of the war and the beginning of a foreign occupation. Which coalition will we, the United States, work with to end the fighting? What should be the terms of the cease-fire? What role will Iran and Russia have in determining who and how Syria is governed after the war? Will Syria survive as one country or will it be divided into cantons or provinces or emirates led by warlords loyal to their own tribal or sectarian interests? A Syrian expert raises the prospect that al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusrat is considering establishing an Islamic emirate in the northern province of Idlib. Others see Latakia as the Alawi "emirate." Will militias continue to operate alongside or instead of a Syrian National Army? One thing seems certain: in a country ravaged by more than 5 years of civil war, terror, starvation, and death, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to restrain the desire for revenge and at the same time build domestic consensus for a new political order in a re-united Syria.

Some Lessons from our Iraq Experience

Lesson #1: Never assume a military campaign will be easy or that the people liberated will be grateful. It isn't and they won't. Gratitude is not an easy word for those whose country has been destroyed, even if a hated despot has been removed. To insist on the presence of foreign forces, extended periods of political tutelage and the suspension of political rights, or foreign advisors or companies overseeing ministries, as we did in Iraq, will only fuel most Syrians' resentment and sense of betrayal.

Lesson #2: Be careful what you ask for. U.S. officials made Iraqis many promises, announced policies, and declared intentions that were ambiguous and contradictory. And many Iraqis, eager to have hopes and ambitions confirmed, accepted the promises, only to see hopes dashed by political realities and decisions made elsewhere. The discourse on Syria is even more complicated given the differences in strategies and tactics pursued by the United States, Saudi Arabia and allies and by Iran, Russia and their Syrian friend, Bashar al-Assad. Do we believe that Moscow and Tehran will be willing to concede to his removal unless something or someone equally acceptable is offered as his replacement? Russia has hinted that it might reconsider its support for Assad but Iran remains a staunch ally. Can we or should we agree with Russia and Iran to allow Bashar to continue to govern while we work on the next regime? Should we accept a role for Iranian and other self-interested governments in determining Syrian foreign and security policies? Russian interests in Syria are not the same as ours. Its military operations have targeted Syrian opposition elements we support and ignored extremist factions we oppose. Moscow and even Iran may be willing to end support to Assad so long as they are able to preserve their interests and keep in power those political and military leaders loyal to them. Moscow probably sees its actions in Syria against most Islamist factions as an unobvious warning to the Islamist terrorists that have conducted terrorist operations in Moscow and other Russian cities. Moscow also benefits by securing access to new military facilities at the same time it demonstrates its military power to the region.

Lesson #3: Domestic consensus on clearly enunciated policy goals in Syria will be critical if diplomatic negotiations are to succeed. Public discussion of foreign and security policy challenges is a hallmark of an open society. Syria may never become a friendly state or share U.S. interests but it has been a key player in regional security issues, especially in our assessing threats to Israel and offering a safe haven to radical extremists. A secure and united Syria could be a key partner in defeating Islamic extremists, but this could require a more serious long-term commitment than U.S. policy may be willing to make.

Lesson #4: Beware of unintended consequences. A key question for Syria, as it was for Iraq, will be how to meld those who by choice or necessity lived as exiles with those who remained within? Who decides—liberator or liberated? Is there a premium to be paid for suffering? Is governance a popularity contest? Does the historical absence of real, functioning democratic institutions and values mean ignorance of how they can and should be applied?

The future of the Syrian security forces and the tribes who supported them is also critical. The Iraqi and Syrian armies were instruments of governmental control and oppression as well as a training ground for future leaders. We like to talk about a depoliticized, professional, downsized, integrated military with a defensive mission, and no weapons of mass destruction. Who will lead and who will serve in the New Model Army? Will there be conscription? Who will design the new military institutions or educational process, which should include a component on civilian control and the elimination of recruitment by tribe, clan, or co-religionist. Will the new Syrian military respect civilian authority? Will it stay off the streets? And, perhaps most important from a U.S. perspective: will we guarantee to defend Syria or parts thereof, from all attacks, including any by Turkey, Iran or Israel, while it is rebuilding? And what are the geographic boundaries of post-Assad Syria? Who will we need to defend Syria against?

And now, the Answers

Facts on the ground may soon provide some hint of Syria's future. The regime is close to re-taking Aleppo, once the opposition's symbol of success, with an intense bombing campaign focused on high civilian casualties, the destruction of hospitals and civil society, and denial of humanitarian aid. Secretary of State Kerry says he hopes talks with Russia will produce a truce for Aleppo and cease-fire in Syria soon, but Damascus has thus far agreed only to a 2-day truce. Russia will play American hopes for a more permanent cease-fire in Aleppo and proximity talks until Assad gains a significant victory in Aleppo.

So, if the United States and its allies intervene more forcefully and defeat the various terrorist groups in Syria?

- *Should they also insist on regime change?* Our allies in Syria do not share our democratic values or faith in representative government. The Saudis were integral in enabling the cease-fire to occur but do not agree with us on a transitional governing body or terms of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Saudi Arabia has long been unhappy with President Obama's reluctance to fight the Syrian regime and remove President Bashar al-Assad as we did Saddam Husayn, or to give the opposition factions more advanced weapons. The Saudis will agree that regime change is necessary but that will mean not necessarily mean a form of government. It could just a transfer of leadership to a representative from one of Syria's old prominent Sunni Arab families. Alawis, Kurds and other minority representatives need not apply.
- *And should they stay after the armed conflict ends to help stabilize the government and help rebuild the country?* The end of conflict and defeat of ISIL and other extremist factions will not ensure a stable or a united Syria. The risk of new mini-wars will be high as those suffering losses of family and property seek revenge and restitution as well as control of the few resources left to be exploited.
- *Make it into a democracy?* The first confrontations between the regime and the Syrian people came

in early 2011 when a teen-age boy wrote anti-Assad graffiti on the walls of a small town. Syrians opposing the regime from inside the country and from exile have talked about their hopes for democratic government and parliamentary democracy. But there are no guarantees that this will be their goal the day after Assad. We will not be in the same dominant position in post-Assad Syria to orchestrate a governing council of favored oppositionists or draw on the support of our Arab allies that we were in post-Saddam Iraq. It is important to remember that Syria is not Iraq, even if solution to one lies in resolution of the other. What works in one place may not work in all places. And we have not resolved tensions within our coalition. For them, the answer will lie in who can offer internal security and end domestic squabbling rather than who is the George Washington of New Syria or the Republic of Latakia. For Washington, the decision becomes at what cost democracy? The cost could include demands that we maintain a military force in the New Syria to protect the fragile republic, something that may be difficult for President Obama or his successor to do. How important is democracy as the end state to the New Syria? Syrians are Arab nationalists with strong ties to their home villages and family roots. De facto governance structures—local councils in a decentralized national structure—already exist; talk of the kind of federalism that has failed in Iraq does not seem popular. Syrians who survive the civil war on all sides may be satisfied with a form of governance that ensures the state will not collapse and that they will survive, something their foreign backers, including Russia, Iran and the Gulf Arabs, can live with.

* Judith Yaphe is Adjunct Professor of International Affairs in the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University.

[1] See biographies of the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State John Foster and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and their sister, a State Department analyst, in *The Brothers*, by Steven Kinzer; and the biography of Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, in *All the Shah's Men*, also by Kinzer. The Dulles brothers were experts on international trade and Europe, their sister was an expert on Germany. Kermit Roosevelt saw himself as an adventurer whose love of the Middle East took him to Egypt and ultimately Iran in time to implement the 1953 coup which removed Prime Minister Mossadagh.

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The Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies
Executive Associate in University Professors Department
1922 F Street NW, Room 413
Washington, DC 20052

(202) 994-8190

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